Beyond the problem of inequality, there are other obstacles to the use of States as representatives of legal persons in the process of concluding an international social contract. Many States, for example, do not adhere to basic moral principles regarding how they treat their own people. It is therefore unlikely that they will argue in accordance with the principles set out in section II. If tyrannical regimes treat their citizens shabby or are unable or unwilling to represent all their citizens equally at home, they are unlikely to introduce norms of justice and reciprocity into international relations. So let us assume that we have reached a social contract. Depending on the initial problem of justification, this will lead to an R result (principles, rules, etc.) that has normative property N – such as justice, morality, authority, obligation, legitimacy, mutual benefit, etc. Suppose the Treaty has produced a principle, a rule, etc. What exactly does the fact that this principle or rule was generated by the contractual arrangement show? The other view is that even after specifying the parties (including their rationality, values, and information), they continue to disagree in their ranking of possible social contracts. From this point of view, the treaty has a certain result only if there is a way to respond to the different classifications of each individual in order to reach an agreement (D`Agostino 2003). Four basic agreement mechanisms can be distinguished. The fundamental difference in this alternative approach to an international social contract lies in the nature of the contracting parties.
While for Rousseau, Kant and Rawls the parties to the international social contract would be states or peoples, for Nussbaum, Pogge and Beitz the theory of the social contract makes the most sense at the international level if the parties to the social contract are imagined as individual human beings. Only if we imagine it this way, these authors argue, will the social contract be interpreted in such a way as to correspond to the liberal basic principles of justice. For this reason, the two-tier model favored by Rawls is replaced by a single original position in which individuals reduce themselves to a set of human rights that are not limited by the contingencies of a particular conception of the state. The basic idea seems simple: in a way, the agreement of all individuals subject to collectively applied social agreements shows that these agreements have normative property (they are legitimate, just, binding, etc.). But even this basic idea is anything but simple, and even this abstract reproduction is reprehensible in many ways. What is the social contract? An agreement between the citizen and the government? No, it would only mean the continuation of [Rousseau`s] idea. The social contract is an agreement between man and man; an agreement from which what we call society must result. In this is the concept of commutative justice, first put forward by the primitive fact of exchange. is replaced by that of distributive justice. If you translate these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is, in its highest sense, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers and renounce any claim to govern each other. Rousseau has two different theories of the social contract.
The first is found in his essay Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, commonly known as the Second Discourse, and is an account of man`s moral and political evolution over time, from a state of nature to modern society. As such, it contains his naturalized representation of the social contract, which he considers highly problematic. The second is his normative or idealized theory of the social contract and aims to provide the means by which the problems that modern society has created for us, as set forth in the social contract, can be mitigated. The agreement of the parties in the deliberative model is certainly hypothetical in the double sense that we have analyzed: a hypothetical agreement between hypothetical parties. But the purpose of the deliberative model is to help us (i.e., “you and me”) solve our problem of justification–what social arrangements we can all accept as “free people who have no authority over each other” (Rawls 1958, 33). The deliberations of the parties and the conditions under which they deliberate thus model our real beliefs in justice and justification. As Rawls (1999, 514) puts it, the reasoning of the hypothetical parts is important to us because “the conditions embodied in the description of this situation are those that we actually accept.” If hypothetical models could not justify the real, the result of the hypothetical. Gaus describes such a thing as a “test concept” of the social contract (2011a, 425). We use the hypothetical deliberative means of the treaty to “test” our social institutions. In this way, the current social contract should be a model of the situation of justification that all individuals face. The hypothetical and abstract nature (see § 2) of the contract is necessary to highlight the relevant characteristics of the parties and to show what their reasons are.
The social contract was seen as an “event” in which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others ceded their own.  This led to the creation of the state, a sovereign entity like individuals now under their rule that would create laws regulating social interactions. Human life is therefore no longer “a war of all against all”. Moehler`s “Multi-Level” contract (2017) has several aspects. First, individuals seek to rely on their pluralistic moral obligations, to agree on socio-moral rules that can all be affirmed as a common morality. This purpose of this agreement is similar to that of the Darwall, Gaus and Southwood models. The second-level agreement is appropriate to the circumstances in which pluralism is so deep and broad that no common morality can be forged. Instead of moral agents, the parties are being rethought as instrumentally rational supervisory agents: the purpose of this second level is rules of cooperation that promote the interests of all when a deeper moral basis cannot be discovered. The other approach to the agreement negotiation models is what we can call a process model. Instead of using different axioms to generate a single rational solution, these theorists rely on a method that produces a specific, but not always unique, result. Process approaches use a mechanism to obtain matches.
An example is an auction. There are many types of auctions (. B for example, English, Dutch, Vickrey, etc.), each with a way to generate offers for certain goods and then decide on a price. Selling at a posted price, as you often see in hypermarkets, is also a kind of bargain, albeit extremely asymmetrical, where the seller offered a “take it or leave it” question. Double bids are more symmetrical and have a clearer link to the original negotiation model. Although auctions are not generally used to solve problems of pure division, there are some examples of auction mechanisms used to solve problems of public goods in interesting ways that guarantee unanimity (Smith, 1977). .